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More of Barnett · Nov 8, 11:00 PM

We have a disparity here of capabilities: [On the one side] a US with a “Leviathan force” as I call it, able to destroy real dangerous elements inside the Gap. But it is almost a hammer looking for nails, because unless you can do the integration on the far side of the conflict, wielding that hammer is almost useless, or worse than useless. It scares people so much, that you almost risk the unity of the Core to employ it. I mean: did everyone in the Core want to see Saddam gone? Sure, he was a bad guy, and it was better for that oil to flow. And the hope is that Iraq will develop on that basis—even though the record of countries developing on the basis of oil is pretty bad.

So everyone had the same desire, but the fear was that if the Unites States was going to do it, how were they going to handle the aftermath? And there we sent all the wrong signals. We said in effect: “If you’re not tough enough to show up for the war, don’t show up for the peace: don’t expect to be cut in on anything!” That was a huge, colossal blunder on our part, a very macho view of security as if the only thing that matters is the “blowing up” part. We have learned since the occupation in May 2003 that our people get killed just as quickly in the peace keeping as in the war part. Actually, more quickly because we do it so badly.

There’s more.

I saw him speak at an annual dinner meeting of the Council for International Visitors, which is how I sponsored George from Ghana (he’s here in Newport studying peace-keeping and the international rule of law at the war college). His thinking and his terminology (e.g. Gap and Core) is refreshingly non-partisian.

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